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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KENNETH L. ROTHEY, Trustee of
the Belnap Family Trust,
Respondent and Plaintiff,
vs.
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
aka FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF
UTAH, a Utah banking corporation,
Appellant and Defendant.

Civil No. 19570

FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH,
$ Utah banking corporation,
Appellant and
Counterclaim Plaintiff,
vs.
KENNETH L. ROTHEY, Trustee of
the Belnap Family Trust,
BARBARA SINE, JAYNIE BELNAP,
LeGRANDE P. BELNAP, ARLENE B.
WALDRON, LESLIE W. KING, PETTY
INVESTMENT COMPANY, PETTY MOTOR
COMPANY, RACHEL LUNT, DORIS
BAGLEY BELNAP, and FIRST SECURITY
BANK OF UTAH, N.A.,
Respondents and
Counterclaim Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT-DEFENDANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This action concerns the right of appellant to
recover certain costs and attorney's fees incurred by
appellant in defending against two actions that challenged
the validity of the trust deed under which appellant was
trustee and beneficiary.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Following a trial, the district court held that
appellant was estopped from collecting, as a part of the
obligation secured by the subject trust deed, any attorney's
fees or costs incurred by appellant in defending against two
actions which had unsuccessfully challenged the validity of
the subject trust deed,
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the trial court's
judgment that appellant is estopped from collecting its costs
and attorney's fees under the subject trust deed, this
Court's determination that appellant is entitled to collect
such amounts, and an order remanding this case to the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County for a
determination of the amount of costs and attorney's fees due
appellant under the trust deed and further proceedings to
foreclose the trust deed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 13, 1963, appellant First Interstate Bank of
Utah, formerly named Walker Bank & Trust Company (hereinafter
referred to as the "Bank"), extended a loan in the amount of
$30,000.00 to Utahna P. Belnap.

The loan was evidenced by a

Promissory Note in the amount of $30,000.00 (the "Note") and
was secured by a Trust Deed (the "Trust Deed") covering all
of Lot 6, Indian Hills Plat B-l (hereinafter referred to as

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the "Property").

(Finding No. 1? R. 340-341).

On July 28,

1972/ Utahna Po Belnap died while married to LeGrande L.
Belnap.

The probate of the estate of Utahna P. Belnap

followed*

The Bank was appointed and served as the Special

Administrator of the estate of Utahna P. Belnap.

(Finding

Nos. 2, 3j R. 341).
During the probate proceeding, Utahna's husband,
LeGrande L* Belnap, initiated two lawsuits, both of which
were either a direct or indirect attack on either the
validity of the title of the reputed owner, Utahna Belnap, or
an attack on the Trust Deed (those two suits are hereinafter
sometimes referred to as the "Actions").
391).

(Finding No. 4; R.

The Bank incurred costs and attorney's fees in

successfully defending against the Actions.

(Finding No. 5;

R. 342). Both of the Actions were ultimately resolved in
favor of the Bank.

In one of the Actions, the district court

determined that the Trust Deed was a subsisting and valid
lien in favor of the Bank against the Property.

(Finding No.

6; R. 342). This Court affirmed that determination.

(R.

382-383).
The Trust Deed, at paragraph 4, provides that the
Trustor agrees:
4. To appear in and defend any action or
proceeding purporting to affect the
security hereof, the title to said
property, or the rights or powers of
Beneficiary or Trustee; and should
Beneficiary or Trustee elect to also
appear in or defend any such action or

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
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proceeding, to pay all costs and
expenses, including costs of evidence of
title and attorney's fees in a reasonable
sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No.2; T., 2/7/83, at 3-5; R. 375-377).
During the probate of the estate of Utahna P.
Belnap, the ownership of the Property encumbered by the Trust
Deed was, pursuant to an agreement, awarded to LeGrande
Belnap, and LeGrande Belnap agreed, as a part of that
agreement, to assume and discharge the Trust Deed.

(Finding

No. 7; R. 342). Through a series of conveyances, plaintiffrespondent in this case, Kenneth L. Rothey as Trustee of the
Belnap Family Trust (hereinafter referred to as "Rothey"),
acquired title to the Property covered by the Trust Deed.
(Conclusion No. 2; R. 347).
For in excess of five years, none of the scheduled
payments under the Note were made to the Bank.

(Finding No.

17; R. 346). Accordingly, the Bank initiated a non-judicial
foreclosure under the Trust Deed, and Rothey initiated this
action seeking (i) to enjoin that non-judicial foreclosure
and (ii) a determination that the Bank was not entitled to
recover its costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending
against the Actions.

(Verified Complaint; R. 6-7).

Rothey

then secured a Temporary Restraining Order restraining the
subject trustee's sale.

(R. 29-30).

The Temporary

Restraining Order issued by the district court on July 28,
1981, provided as follows in Paragraph 2:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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_

That as a condition precedent to the
issuance hereof and in lieu of the
posting of security or bond as required
by Rule 65(a) (c), Plaintiff be and hereby
is required to tender to Defendant the
sum of $15,094.70, the amount of
principal and interest due on the subject
Trust Deed and Note.
Following the district court's entry of the
Temporary Restraining Order, Rothey served upon the Bank a
"Tender of Payment" in "the sum of $15,094.70 representing
the amount of the principal and interest due according to the
Notice of Trustee's Sale filed and published by the
Defendant."

(R. 16, 27). Rothey delivered to the Bank his

counsel's Trust Account check in that amount, and the Bank
negotiated the check with the following endorsements
Endorsement does not constitute accord
and satisfaction. Payee reserves all
claims and rights it has to collect its
full administrative charges and
attorney's fees under the Note and Trust
Deed.
First Interstate Bank (formerly
known as Walker Bank & Trust
Company)
By: s/
Assistant Vice President
(Defendant's Exhibit 19? T., 2/8/83 at 4-5; R. 500-501).
The Bank counterclaimed seeking a judicial
foreclosure of its Trust Deed and a determination that it is
entitled to recover the costs and attorney's fees expended in
defending against the Actions (Answer and Counterclaim; R.
54-57) .

In his Reply to the Counterclaim, Rothey pleaded the

following two defenses:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
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a.

That the Bankfs receipt of principal and

interest precludes it from recovering attorney's fees and
costs,

(Reply to Counterclaim, Third and Fourth Defenses; R.

80; Answers of Plaintiff to Defendant's First Set of
Interrogatory Nos. 6 and 7; R. 152-153)•
b.

That the Bank's failure to make a claim against

the estate of Utahna Belnap for the costs and attorney's fees
incurred while acting as Special Administrator of the estate
bars its recovery of such costs and attorney's fees,

(Reply

to Counterclaim, Fifth and Sixth Defenses; R. 80-81).
At trial, the parties agreed that their only
dispute was over whether the Bank could in this action
recover its costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending
against the Actions,

(T., 2/7/83, at 21; R. 393). After

evidence had been introduced and testimony given, Rothey's
counsel presented to the trial court "three theories that the
Court has now heard something about which the Court could
find that Walker Bank & Trust is simply not entitled to those
fees."

(T., 2/8/83, at 52; R. 548).
The first theory was that the Bank is barred in

this action under principles of res judicata from seeking its
costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending against the
Actions because the Bank should have requested such costs and
attorney's fees in the Actions.
548-568).

(T., 2/8/83, at 52-72; R.

This theory was not pleaded in Rothey's Reply to

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Counterclaim and was presented over the Bank's objection,
(See T., 2/8/83, at 91-92; R. 587-588) •

Rothey's second

theory corresponds to the Third and Fourth Defenses set out
in his Reply to the Bank's counterclaim; that is, that the
Bank's receipt of principal and interest due under the Note
and Trust Deed precludes it from recovering attorney's fees.
(T., 2/8/83, at 72-75; R. 568-571).

Rothey's third and final

theory was that the Actions did not attack the title to the
Property or the interests of the Trustee, and that,
consequently, the Bank could not recover its costs and
attorney's fees incurred in defending against the Actions.
(T., 2/8/83, at 75-76; R. 571-572).

Rothey's counsel never

argued or offered evidence upon any other theory or defense
that would preclude the Bank's recovery of its costs and
attorney's fees in the Actions.
The trial court rendered its judgment from the
bench.

The trial court found every fact and element that was

necessary for it to rule for the Bank.

The trial court also

rejected every theory or defense that Rothey had offered or
argued.

First, the trial court ruled that it did not have to

address Rothey's res judicata theory because it had not been
pleaded by Rothey.

(T., 2/8/83, at 118; R. 614). Second,

the trial court dispensed with Rothey's argument that the
Bank's receipt of principal and interest precludes it from
recovering attorney's fees.

The court stated that "this is
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not a case of accord and satisfaction . . • ."

(T., 2/8/83,

at 118; R. 614; see also Conclusion No. 8; R. 349). Finally,
the trial court rejected Rothey's third theory by construing
the Trust Deed to mean that "if they [the Bank] advance
monies in behalf of the trustor, or if they elect in their
own behalf to defend the sanctity or the sacredness of their
security, that they may do so and charge those amounts
against the trustor, and they thereby become secured by the
trust deed document."

(T., 2/8/83, at 119-120; R. 615-616;

see also Conclusion No. 3; R. 347-348).

In connection with

this statement the trial court also found that the Actions
were "either a direct or indirect attack . . . on either the
i

validity of the title of the reputed owner, Utahna Belnap,
. . . or an attack on the integrity of the underlying
security document, namely, the trust deed."

(T., 2/8/83, at

120-121; R. 616-617; see also, Finding No. 4; R. 341). The
trial court accordingly concluded that the Bank's costs and
attorney's fees incurred in defending against the Actions
were recoverable under the Trust Deed.

(Conclusion Nos. 3

and 4; R. 347-348) .
The trial court could, indeed should, have stopped
at this point.

All of the requirements for the Bank's

recovery of its costs and attorney's fees had been found by
the court.

More importantly, all of Rothey's defenses had

been rejected by the court.

Since all defenses to the Bank's

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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counterclaim were cleared away, the trial court should have
granted the counterclaim and allowed the Bank to recover its
costs and attorney's fees as amounts secured by the Trust
Deed*

However, the trial court reached beyond the pleadings

and beyond the record to make its final disposition.
The trial court found that the Bank "failed to give
LeGrande L. Belnap, or his successors or assigns, including
Plaintiff herein, any meaningful or substantive notice that
it had claimed, was claiming, or would claim the attorney's
fees incurred in connection with [the Actions] as due and
payable under the Trust Deed."

(Conclusion No. 6; R. 348).

From this finding, the court concluded that "[t]he bank is
estopped by such failure to claim or collect the fees as a
part of the foreclosure of the subject Trust Deed."
(Conclusion No. 7; R. 348).
ARGUMENT
The trial court's judgment must be reversed because
(i) the trial court's own rulings entitle the Bank to recover
the disputed costs and attorney's fees; (ii) the sole basis
for the judgment was neither pleaded nor argued by Rothey;
(iii) the trial court's holding requiring that the Bank give
Rothey notice of its claiming attorney's fees is contrary to
the law, (iv) ino evidence supports the dispositive factual
findings of the trial court relating to that holding; and (v)
even assuming the correctness of the trial court's theory,

- Library,
9 - J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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other essential factual elements of estoppel were neither
proved nor found by the trial court.

Each point will be

addressed in turn,
POINT I
BASED UPON THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS,
THE BANK IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER THE
DISPUTED FEES AND EXPENSES.
In its Counterclaim in this action, the Bank prayed
for the following:

(i) that the court determine the amount

due under the Note and secured by the Trust Deed, including
costs and attorney's fees incurred by the Bank, and (ii) that
the Trust Deed be foreclosed to satisfy said amount.
57).

(R. 56-

The trial court found each and every element that was

necessary for it to grant the relief prayed for in the Bank's
Counterclaim.

First, the trial court found that Utahna

Belnap executed and delivered the Note and executed,
acknowledged and delivered the Trust Deed to the Bank.
(Finding No. 1; R. 340-341).

*

Second, the trial court

concluded that the Trust Deed is a valid and enforceable
first lien and encumbrance against the Property.

(Conclusion

*

No. 1; R. 347). Third, the trial court found that the Trust
Deed allows the Bank, as Trustee and Beneficiary, to appear
in and defend any action purporting to affect the security of

i

the Trust Deed, the title to the Property, or the rights and
powers of the Bank under the Trust Deed.
R. 347-348).

(Conclusion No. 3;

Fourth, the trial court determined that costs

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

M

and attorney's fees expended by the Bank in defending such
actions are secured by the Trust Deed,

(Id,).

Fifthf the

trial court concluded that the Actions were both either a
direct or indirect attack on either the validity of title to
the Property or on the validity of the Trust Deed.
(Conclusion No. 4? R. 348). Sixth, the trial court found
that the Bank appeared in and defended against the Actions
and expended attorney's fees in so defending.
*5j R» 348) .

(Finding No.

Seventh, the trial court found that none of the

scheduled payments due under the Note were made between
February, 1976 and July, 1981 —

the Bank did not commence

trustee's sale proceedings under the Trust Deed until the
Note had been in default for more than five years.

(Finding

No. 17; R. 346) .
In short, the Bank succeeded in establishing to the
trial court's satisfaction a prima facie case entitling it to
recover the disputed attorney's fees under the Trust Deed.
Every single fact and element that the Bank was required to
prove was proved by the Bank and the trial court's findings
and conclusions so state.

Absent an effective affirmative

defense by Rothey, the trial court should have proceeded to
determine the amount of costs and attorney's fees incurred by
the Bank in defending against the Actions and to decreed the
foreclosure of the Trust Deed to recover those costs and
fees.

The trial court rejected all of Rothey's defenses.
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As will be shown below, the theory of defense adopted by the
trial court was neither pleaded nor argued by Rothey, is not
supported by the evidence, and is contrary to law.

Because

the Bank has established its case, because the trial court
rejected all of Rothey's defenses, and because the defense
created by the trial court cannot be sustained, the trial
court should be reversed and this case should be remanded for
a determination of the amount of fees and costs due the Bank
under the Trust Deed and further proceedings to foreclose the
Trust Deed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS
RULING ON AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
NEITHER PLEADED NOR ARGUED BY ROTHEY.
Rothey's Reply to the Bank's Counterclaim seeking
judicial foreclosure of the Trust Deed, and inclusion of the
disputed attorney's fees in the amount secured by the Trust
Deed, raised only the following two affirmative defenses:
(i) that because the Bank has accepted the payment of all
principal and interest owed under the Trust Deed, it is
precluded from proceeding to foreclose the Trust Deed to
recover its costs and attorney's fees (Reply to Counterclaim,
Third and Fourth Defenses; R. 80; see also Answers of
Plaintiff to Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories, Nos. 6
and 7; R. 152-153), and (ii) that the Bank, as Special
Administrator of the estate of Utahna P. Belnap, was entitled

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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T) _

to seek payment for all services rendered in that capacity as
a part of that probate proceeding and that due to the Bank's
failure to apply for such payment it is estopped from seeking
those fees as part of the foreclosure of the Trust Deed,
(Reply to Counterclaim, Fifth and Sixth Defense, R. 80-81?
see also Answers of Plaintiff to Defendant's First Set of
Interrogatories, Nos. 8 and 9; R. 153-54).
It is true that in his Fourth Defense to the Bank's
Counterclaim, Rothey pleaded generally that the Bank is
"estopped" to claim the subject costs and attorney's fees.
(R. 80). When asked by interrogatory what facts supported
that Fourth Defense, however, Rothey stated only that the
Bank failed to request payment for costs and attorney's fees
in the probate proceeding.

(Answers of Plaintiff to

Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories, No. 7; R. 153). At
no time prior to the trial court's announcement of its
judgment did the Bank receive notice that anyone was placing
reliance on a theory that the Bank is estopped by its failure
to advise Rothey that it would claim the subject costs and
fees *
Both at trial and in defending against the Bank's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment during the month prior to
trial, Rothey argued only the following three theories:

(i)

that the Bank is barred by res judicata from claiming the
disputed attorney's fees because the Bank had failed to claim

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
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them in connection with the Actions (T., 2/8/83, at 52-72; R.
548-568; R. 253-259); (ii) that the Bank had waived any right
to claim the disputed attorney's fees by accepting payment of
principal and interest due under the Note (T., 2/8/83, at 7275; R. 568-571; R. 259-263); and (iii) that the Actions did
not challenge title to the Property and that, therefore, the
Bank's expenses incurred in defending against the actions
were not recoverable under the terms of the Trust Deed (T.,
2/8/83, at 75-76; R. 571-572; R. 252-253).
The trial court rejected each and every one of
Rothey's arguments.

The trial court found specifically (i)

that res judicata was inapplicable;

(ii) that the Bank did

not waive its right to claim attorney's fees by accepting
payment of principal and interest due under the Note
(Conclusion No. 8; R. 349); and (iii) that the Bank's

Res judicata was not pleaded by Rothey in his Reply to the
Bank's Counterclaim. The Bank's counsel objected to any
evidence offered to support this affirmative defense. (T.,
2/8/83, at 92-93; R. 588-580). Under Rule 8(c), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, the plea of res judicata must be pleaded
affirmatively, and if not so interposed is waived. See Board
of County Commissioners v. City and County of Denver, 547
P.2d 249, 251 (Colo. 1976). The lower court ultimately
agreed with the Bank:
"[T]his is not a case of res judicata,
there having been no affirmative defense
raised and the Court not having received
a motion nor granted a motion about res
judicata."
(T., 2/8/83, at 118; R. 614).
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expenses incurred in the Actions were recoverable by the
terms of the Trust Deed (Conclusions No, 3 and 4; R. 347348) •
Two glaring and dispositive facts emerge from the
foregoing review of the pleadings, arguments and ruling in
this case.

First, the trial court rejected explicitly each

and every defense that was either pleaded or argued by
Rothey.

Second, and this fact emerges inescapably from the

first, Rothey never pleaded nor did he ever argue that the
Bank had a duty to give LeGrande L. Belnap, or his successors
or assigns, including Rothey, meaningful or substantive
notice that it was claiming the attorney's fees incurred in
defending against the Actions,

(Conclusion No. 6, R. 348;

T., 2/8/83, at 125, R. 621), neither did Rothey ever plead or
argue that the Bank's breach of such duty estopped it from
recovering the disputed attorney's fees.

The trial court's

reliance on this unpleaded and unargued defense, of which the
Bank had absolutely no notice, is plain reversible error.
Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides
as follows:
In pleading to a preceding pleading, a
party shall set forth affirmatively
. . . estoppel . . . , and any other
matter constituting an avoidance or
affirmative defense*
Plainly, Rothey8s Reply to the Bank's Counterclaim is the
type of "pleading to a preceding pleading" contemplated by
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Rule 8(c). See Resources Engineering, Inc. v. Siler, 94
Idaho 935, 500 P.2d 836 (1972); Bowers v. Edwards, 79 Nev.
384, 385 P.2d 783 (1963).

Just as clearly, the trial court's

theory that (i) the Bank had a duty to keep the Trustor under
the Trust Deed advised of the Bank's expenses incurred in
defending against the action and (ii) that the Bank's breach
of that duty estops the Bank from claiming such expenses,
must be affirmatively pleaded under Rule 8(c) as "estoppel
[or] any other matter constituting an avoidance or
2
affirmative defense."
Rothey's failure to plead estoppel
based on the Bank's breach of its purported duty to inform
the Trustor of the disputed attorney's fees precluded the
2
"A general and almost universal
identifying criterion of an affirmative
defense is one in avoidance, or stated
alternatively a direct or implicit
admission of plaintiff's claim and
assertion of other facts which would
defeat a right to recovery."
Texas Gulf Sulphur Company v. Robles, 511 P.2d 963, 965
(Wyo. 1973). See Roberts v. Mitchell Bros. Truck Lines, 289
Or. 119, 611 P.2d 297, 301 (1980). The theory invented by
the trial court falls well within this definition of the
phrase "any other matter constituting an avoidance or
affirmative defense" in Rule 8(c). The trial court found
that the Bank was entitled to the disputed attorney's fees
under the terms of the Trust Deed, but that the Bank's breach
of its duty to keep the Trustor advised of such fees estopped
the Bank from recovering them.
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trial court from relying on such a theory to dispose of this
case.
Rothey's Reply to the Bank's Counterclaim did
utilize the word "estopped*"

(Reply to Counterclaim, Fourth,

Fifth and Sixth Defenses; R. 8 0 ) .

Rothey's answers to the

Bank's interrogatories, however, make clear that Rothey did
not plead or intend to assert the estoppel theory adopted by
the lower court.

The "estoppel" pleaded in Rothey's Reply

tothe Bank's Counterclaim referred only to the following!
(a)

that the Bank's acceptance of principal and

interest due under the Note and Trust Deed "estopped" it from
claiming the disputed attorney's fees.

(Answers of Plaintiff

to Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories, Nos. 7, 8 and 9;
R. 153-154), and
(b)

that the Bank, "as special administrator of

the estate of Utahna P. Belnap, was entitled to seek the
payment for all services rendered in that capacity as a part
of said proceeding.

By reason of the fact that [the Bank]

failed to make application for reimbursement for all services
rendered as part of this proceeding

[the Bank] is thereby

estopped from seeking those fees as part of the foreclosure
of the subject Trust Deed."

(_Id.) (Emphasis added).

Most persuasively, however, Rothey's counsel, in
argument at trial and in defending against the Bank's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment in the month prior to trial,
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never stated or even hinted that Rothey asserted any defense,
estoppel, or theory based upon the Bank's failure to advise
the Trustor or her successor of the Bank's claims for
expenses and attorney's fees.

(R. 248-271; T. 2/8/83, at 50-

81, 111-118; R. 546-577, 607-614).
Rothey simply never pleaded the estoppel theory
adopted by the trial court,,

Consequently, Rothey could not

rely on that theory and the trial court erred in adopting it.
The law is clear that estoppel must be pleaded with
particularity, and pleading one kind of estoppel does not
permit proof of another.

Kirk v. Kirk, 205 Okla. 482, 238

P.2d 808, 810 (1951); In re Anderson's Estate, 121 Mont. 515,
194 P.2d 621, 626-627 (1948).

As this Court stated in Tracy

Loan & Trust Co. v. Qpenshaw Investment Co., 102 Utah 509,
132 P.2d 388, 391 (1942), "Where a party seeks to raise an
estoppel to a claim set forth in the pleadings, facts
constituting an estoppel must be pleaded."

(Emphasis added).

See also Collett v. Goodrich, 119 Utah 662, 231 P.2d 730, 733
(1951).

The only facts pleaded by Rothey with respect to

estoppel concerned the Bank's acceptance of principal and
interest due under the Note and Trust Deed and costs and
expenses incurred by the Bank in connection with probate of
the estate of Utahna P. Belnap.

No facts were ever pleaded

or presented at trial which constituted the estoppel found by
the trial court.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
_ i Q _

In this state as in others, theories of estoppel or
avoidance and affirmative defenses must be affirmatively
pleaded or they are waived.

In Collett v. Goodrich, 119 Utah

662, 231 P.2d 730 (1951), for example, the Court stated "the
majority view [which] requires a party who has the
opportunity to do so to specially plead an equitable
estoppel.

Where the estoppel is not pleaded, it is

inadmissible."

231 P.2d, at 733.

The court quoted the

following from Homberger v. Alexander, 11 Utah 363, 40 P.
260, 262 (1895) as the obvious reason for the rule:

"The

object of the declaration is to give the defendant fair
notice of the case he is called into court to meet."

So

here, counsel for the Bank prepared for trial unaware that he
would be called upon to rebut the novel theory eventually
adopted by the trial court.

Indeed, since the theory adopted

by the trial court was neither raised in Rothey's pleadings
nor argued at or prior to trial, counsel for the Bank was not
even called upon to rebut or offer evidence as to that
theory.

As will be more fully explained in the following

sections of this Brief, counsel for Rothey was similarly
caught off guard by the trial court's creative jurisprudence
— — Rothey's counsel neither pleaded, argued nor produced any
evidence to support the trial court's theory.
The trial court's error in adopting a theory of
estoppel that was neither pleaded nor argued below requires
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reversal of its judgment and a remand for a hearing to
determine the appropriate amount of costs and attorney's fees
that the Bank is entitled to under the Trust Deed.

Maxey v.

Jefferson County School District, 158 Colo. 583, 408 P.2d 970
(1965) , is instructive in this regard.

Plaintiff in that

case sought a retroactive pay increase based upon certain
teacher salary schedules.

The case was tried and the trial

court thereafter dismissed the complaint on the grounds of
laches and estoppel since the plaintiff had neither
complained about nor sought to enforce payment of the salary
differential.

In reversing the trial court's dismissal of

the complaint, the Colorado Supreme Court noted the
following:
Although defendant's Answer admits the
employment and denies the claimed
coverage, yet it fails affirmatively to
plead laches or estoppel as required by
Rule 8(c), R.C.P. Colo.
Nor does this record show any waiver
by plaintiff in error of her right to
object to defendant raising these issues
at a later time. In this connection, the
record discloses that such defenses were
first urged upon the court orally at
trial. Not having been pled, as
required, we hold that the trial court
erred in considering such defenses,
especially over the objections of counsel
for plaintiff in error.
408 P.2d, at 971.
The facts of the instant case are, of course, even
more egregious than those which prompted the reversal in
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contrast ,, Rothey ne i t her p ! eaded nor argued the estoppel
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Rothey's failure in this regard is understandable since he
never pleaded or argued for the imposition of such a duty.
As the trial court expressly concluded, the Trust
Deed allows the Bank to defend against actions like the
Actions and to add costs incurred in such defense to the
amount secured by the Trust Deed.
R. 347-348).

(Conclusions Nos. 3 and 4;

The relationship between the Trustor and its

successors and the Bank that is established by the Trust Deed
with respect to such costs is that of, or closely analogous
to, indemnitor (the Trustor) and indemnitee (the Bank).

As

was stated in Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 119
Cal. Rptr. 449, 532 P.2d 97, 100 (1975): "Indemnity may be
defined as the obligation resting on one party to make good a
loss or damage another party has incurred."
The trial court's imposition of a duty on the Bank,
as indemnitee, to notify the Trustor or its successor, as
indemnitor, of expenses incurred in defending against the
actions is contrary to the law of those jurisdictions that
have addressed this issue.

The general rule is that unless

specifically required by the terms of the indemnification
agreement itself, an indemnitee has no duty to notify his
indemnitor that he is incurring expenses for which the
indemnitor may ultimately be liable.
In Boston and Maine Railroad v. Bethlehem Steel
Co., 311 F.2d 847 (1st Cir. 1963), plaintiff-railroad
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Plaintiff, an issuer of securities, sued a broker for
indemnification.

Plaintiff and the broker had agreed that

the broker would sell certain of plaintiff's investment
contracts.

The broker promised to abide by applicable

securities laws and agreed to indemnify plaintiff in the
event that the broker violated such laws.

The broker sold

some of the investment contracts in a state, North Carolina,
in which the offering was not registered.

North Carolina

threatened to indict plaintiff but agreed to forestall
indictment in return for plaintiff's reimbursement of all
buyers in the state.

Plaintiff paid out a substantial sum

and looked to the broker for indemnification.

The broker

defended on the ground that he had not been notified of
plaintiff's settlement with the state.

The court rejected

the brokers argument, stating:
Nor is [plaintiff's] claim barred by the
absence of formal notice to the broker
that [plaintiff] was required to rescind
the sales to North Carolina residents.
Although no North Carolina precedent
dealing precisely with this issue has
been called to our attention, we believe
that the state's Supreme Court would
adhere to the general rule that notice is
unnecessary unless the contract of
indemnity requires it.
578 F.2d, at 554.
As these cases make clear, an indemnitee is not
under any duty, absent a contrary indication in the indemnity
agreement, to notify his indemnitor of claims that may bind
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condition precedent to recovery that the party seeking
reimbursement must give the other party "meaningful" and
"substantive" notice of the claim for reimbursement as
reimbursable expenses are incurred

an obligation for

which the parties did not contract, to which the parties
did not agree, and over which the parties have no
control.

The trial court's theory imposes a material

provision in all contracts, which the parties never
considered and to which the parties never agreed.
2.

If the party entitled to reimbursement cannot

locate the responsible party to give him notice, the
party's contractual right to reimbursement is
extinguished.
3.

In every lawsuit where such damages are sought,

the party entitled to reimbursement must not only prove
his entitlement to damages and the amount thereof, he
must also prove that he gave the other party
"meaningful" and "substantive" notice of his damages as
they were incurred

a fact-intensive finding that

will practically eliminate the possibility of summary
judgment in such contract cases and will complicate and
protract all contract trials.
4.

If this Court adopts the trial court's theory,

this Court can reasonably expect an avalanche of
litigation directed at the nature, form, content,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

such ease.-.,

rue new :ie f\-:nse of; insufficient form,

content, frequency <-•* timeliness of; n^tjce of : :i-

defense in contract actions*
In cases wheie ^t:touieyr,s t ees are - r)*~

5.

rei ill:;;)! irsement (iii im a] 1
is entitled to recover r.

*^ - *'•*'

,

>m for

* -.. -

attorney & tees , tne j. -ar ty

meaningful i y n advise tus

claiming recovery iitus
oppone n t o f h i s a 11 o i:

-

<

thereby giving to his opponent informed.on as to the
amount of time being expended and the economic b in den r.o
which the claimant is bei ng subjected in the ijtigati on
-—

otherwise cont K Jen t ial information rnat r ^

-i orient

can .j«e t-> his strategic advantage :• n settlement
discussior ^;
. ,
entitled

t

' otherwise*
- . *<

' ,»uioeent parties ^hn are

..-i damages w.il be deprived

*t the,?

iiu«- ~-\

hyper t^chn i crs I pr i nr c;%- »'M* t iw- =*v^.<*qer reasonable
pej v,

^ .".II. > <- «-•

•

> ft; • <

.-* i j ;^ c t.hey' s

counsel, for example, who 's pia nly rjoir* and was
motivated to avoid payment here, never conceived of this
pjr . •-*. i p i e .

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
- 27 •
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

nI y

The trial court's theory, being both devoid of
support in the law and lacking in logic or common sense, must
be rejected.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE BANK FAILED TO NOTIFY THE
TRUSTOR OF THE DISPUTED ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Assuming that the trial court properly considered
its "estoppel" theory despite Rothey's failure to plead it
and that the trial court properly held that the Bank had a
duty to notify the Trustor or its successor of its attorney's
fees despite the fact that the law states plainly that no
such duty exists, the fact remains that no evidence produced
at trial supports either (i) the finding that the Bank
breached the asserted "duty" or (ii) the finding that the
Trustor or her successor relied to his or her detriment upon
that breach.
A. No Evidence Supports the Finding that
the Bank Failed to Apprise the Trustor or
her Successor of the Bank's Claim to or
Magnitude of Attorney's Fees.
The finding which supports the trial court's
estoppel theory was first stated by the district court as
follows:
That none of the statements [reflecting
the disputed attorney's fees] were ever
delivered to or shown to Utahna P.
Belnap, LeGrande L. Belnap or any of
their successors or assigns. The Court
specifically finds that neither Plaintiff
nor anyone claiming by, through or under
him had knowledge of the nature, extent
or amount of the attorney's fees being
paid
bythe Howard
the W.
bank,
nor
were
such
Digitized by
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because

he

had neither pleaded nor argued any legal theory that relied
on such evidence.

Similarlyf the Bank presented no evidence

concerning delivery of the statements to the Trustor or her
successors because such evidence did not affect either its
claim to foreclose the Trust Deed or Rothey's defenses to
that claim.
As has already been discussed, neither the "duty"
first conceived by the trial court nor the estoppel that
supposedly follows from a breach of that duty was either
pleaded or argued by Rothey.

The trial transcript in this

case can be searched in vainf therefore, for any discussion
of, or evidence relating to, such a "duty" or estoppel.

A

synopsis of the evidence offered and the testimony taken,
however, reveals just how far the trial court was stretching
to find factual support for its unprecedented theory.
Rothey himself was the first witness.

He testified

that he was involved in both of the Actions as counsel to
LeGrande Belnap.

(T., 2/7/83, at 27-33; R. 401-405).

In

light of this clear testimony, it is difficult to understand
the trial court's finding that the Trustor under the Trust
Deed or her successor was unaware of the Bank's efforts in
defending against the Actions.

Rothey jjs the successor to

the Trustor and has been since January 13, 1978.

(Verified

Complaint, Paragraph 12; R. 4 ) . Prior to that time, Rothey
acted as counsel to the Trustor's successor.

Rothey even
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Kay Lewis was then called.

He testified as to a

"typical" attorney's fee for a trustee's sale.

(T., 2/8/83,

at 44-49; R. 540-545) .
The foregoing summary makes clear that there was no evidence
offered on the issue whether the Bank gave its counsel's
statements to Rothey or his predecessors.
Since estoppel is an affirmative defense, its
proponent, Rothey, has the burden of proving it.

Corporation

Nine v. Taylor, 30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417, 420 (1973).

No

evidence having been offered on the issue, the defense fails.
Taken as a whole, however, the undisputed evidence
establishes that Rothey and his predecessors knew that the
Bank claimed an entitlement to recover the subject fees and
were advised of the amount thereof.

That the Bank claimed

the right to recover such fees is plainly spelled out in
paragraph 4 of the Trust Deed itself (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 ) ,
which was a matter of public record and was the very object
of dispute in the Actions.

Rothey testified that during his

representation of LeGrande Belnap in the Actions, he had
occasion to discuss settlement with the Bank's counsel
"several times."

(T., 2/7/83, at 31-32; R. 403-404).

Rothey stated:
The settlement always involved the
question of the trust deed as it affected
the property which Mr. Belnap claimed
title to and it always involved the
propriety of attorney's fees growing out
of Walker Bank's defense of any claims
that Mr. Belnap had raised against them.
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the Bank's claim to attorney's fees.

That evidence

establishes that Rothey and his predecessors did know of the
Bank's claim to the fees in question, did know of an exact
amount of fees claimed by the Bank on at least one occasion,
and did "several times" during settlement discussions discuss
attorney's fees incurred by the Bank in the Actions.

There

was no evidence that further "meaningful" and "substantive"
discussions did not occur.

No evidence supports the trial

court's finding to the contrary on an issue upon which Rothey
had the burden of proof.

The trial court's finding of

insufficient notice cannot be sustained.
B. The Trial Court did not Find, and No
Evidence Supports, the Existence of
Detrimental Reliance, an Essential
Ingredient of Estoppel.
Even if there was evidence to support the finding
that the Bank failed to inform the Trustor of the disputed
attorney's fees, there was no evidence that the Trustor or
her successors relied on such failure.

Indeed, the trial

court failed to even make a finding as to reliance.

Since

reliance is an essential element of equitable estoppel under
Utah law, the trial Court's "estoppel" theory fails.
In Jones v. Department of Employment Security, 641
P.2d 156, 161 (Utah 1982), this Court set out the following:
Elements of equitable estoppel are as
follows: conduct by one party which
leads another party, in reliance thereon,
to adopt a course of action resulting in
detriment or damage if the first party is
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CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment cannot be sustained and
must be reversed for six independently sufficient reasons:
First, the trial court found every fact necessary to support
the Bank's recovery of its attorney's fees and costs incurred
in the Actions.

Second, the trial court expressly rejected

each defense advanced by Rothey.

Third, the trial court

based its ruling upon a defense and theory that was never
pleaded or argued by Rothey and of which the Bank had
absolutely no notice.

Fourth, the trial court's

contrary to law and good sense.

theory is

Fifth, no evidence supports

the finding, essential to the trial court's dispositive
theory, that the Bank failed timely to advise Rothey or his
predecessors that it claimed the subject fees.

Sixth, the

trial court made no finding, and no evidence establishes the
essential requirement, that Rothey or his predecessors relied
in any respect upon the Bank's conduct.

A plainer case for

reversal cannot be conceived.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ 3

day of February,

1984.
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